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Thank you very much, Dorian and Theresa for those really kind words 
of welcome, and thank you to all of you and to the administration of the 
university for inviting me here. So in the United Kingdom where I live 
and where I work, the National Health Service or NHS is the primary 
provider of preventative and therapeutic healthcare for 65 million 
citizens. NHS care is free at the point of need. it’s not means tested. It’s 
funded by taxes and central government. 
The NHS provides general practitioners, specialist consultants, 
hospital doctors, surgeons and nurses, community nurses, midwives, 
pharmacists, paramedics, counselors, mental health services, 
contraception and sexual health services all free at the point of delivery. 
Across the UK it includes free medication on prescription for under 
18’s, over 60’s, pregnant women and new mothers, some people with 
disabilities, and people in receipt of social security benefits. All UK 
residents are eligible for NHS services. 
A leaflet distributed shortly prior to the launch of NHS in 1948 spells 
out its vision, deeply rooted in the notion of a common good. It will 
provide you with all medical, dental, and nursing care. Everyone rich 
or poor, man, woman, or child can use it or any part of it. But it’s not 
a charity. You’re paying for it mainly as taxpayers and it will relieve 
your money worries in times of illness. I’d like to play you a short audio 
recording of Aneurin Bevan, the architect of the NHS speaking, and this 
is taken from an exhibit at the People’s History Museum in Manchester.
[Recording Plays]
Aneurin: I’m proud about the National Health Service. It’s a piece of 
real socialism. It’s a piece of real Christianity too you know. We had 
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to wait a long time for it. What I had in mind when we organized the 
National Health Service in 1948 to 1958, and remember when we did 
it, you younger ones, this is immediately after the end of World War II 
when we were, as Sir Winston Churchill then said, a bankrupt nation. 
But nevertheless we did these things, and there is nowhere in any nation 
in the world, communist or capitalist, any health service to compare 
with it. Now the National Health Service had two pain principles 
underlining it. One, that the medical arts of science and healing should 
be made available to people when they needed them, irrespective of 
whether they could afford to pay for them or not. 
That was the first principle. The second was that this should be done 
not at the expense of the poorer members of the community but of the 
well to do. In short, I refuse to accept the insurance principle. I refuse 
to accept the principle that the National Health Service should be paid 
by contributions. I refuse to accept that. I refused to accept it because I 
thought it was nonsense. If you hadn’t fully paid up. you couldn’t have 
a second class operation because your card wasn’t full of stamps, could 
you? 
Susanna: So that I think is a really powerful vision of the common 
good, not an uncontested one, not an unproblematic one, but a powerful 
one nonetheless, based in the conviction that healthcare shouldn’t be 
a privilege of the deserving or the rich. From its inception though it’s 
faced challenges. The population continues to grow, and under our 
current government the NHS’s budget continues to shrink. Nonetheless, 
within its remit is written into law and into the NHS’s own contract 
of care that the provider must take account of the spiritual, religious, 
pastoral, and cultural needs of all service users. 
So commissioning groups have had difficult decisions to make about 
the prioritization of funds and about how to balance the good and 
the needs of individual patients with those of society as a whole. Is 
care for everyone simply too costly? How should different aspects of 
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healthcare be prioritized? And in this lecture I’ll be considering the 
place of spiritual care, itself increasingly marginalized in the NHS 
particularly for transgender people who might also be considered a 
niche or a marginal group, and I’ll point to the necessity of affirming 
and compassionate theologies around transgender and also the emerging 
work of transgender Christians and their allies. 
And then later in the lecture I move to considering how goods play 
out and how understandings of the common good play out in another 
area of gender medicine, that involving the decisions made around 
intersex children and their healthcare. And if terms like “intersex” and 
“transgender” are not familiar to you, please don’t worry, we’re going to 
unpack them as we go along.
So first of all, what is transgender? It’s a term some of you will be very 
familiar with, others less so perhaps. Transgender people experience a 
disjunction of some kind between their physical sex and their gender 
identity, that is their sense of being a man or a woman. Some seek 
hormone therapy or various physical surgeries in order to bring their 
bodies more into line with their identity. 
Others however either because of choice or because of lack of access 
to funding for medical interventions may live in their preferred gender 
without ever going through any physical alterations. In the UK the 
average age for beginning gender transition is 42, and I think this is 
significant as by their 40s most people are well-established in their adult 
lives, they may well have spouses, children, and visible public roles in 
their communities. Transition is usually something they have considered 
long and hard. 
So weighing out goods in this context also means awareness of the 
possible challenges posed to others who felt invested in the lives and 
relationships with people who transition, and this is where I think 
some of the recent evangelical commentators on transgender, people 
like Mark Yarhouse, Vaughan Roberts, and Andrew Walker are clearly 
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motivated by compassion and concern for families and relations, but 
where I suspect they get the balance slightly wrong, because I think 
they’re too unreflective about the harm that a narrow binary gender 
system does to all of us, not just to trans people.
Theological responses to transgender, and I’m thinking of those 
particularly that have emerged since the last years of the 20th 
century, have sometimes focused on Biblical texts such as those from 
Deuteronomy and Leviticus which outlaw for example women wearing 
men’s apparel, offering animals with bruised or crushed testes as 
sacrifices, or admitting to the assembly of the Lord someone whose 
penis has been cut off. And I’ve discussed in more length elsewhere the 
fact that such texts appear to be as much about issues like disability and 
concerns about preserving the community by ensuring the continued 
possibility of procreation as well as in terms of markers of inclusion 
such as male circumcision as they are about sex per se. 
Furthermore, there is a counter stream within the Biblical texts 
themselves which point to a community in which those with torn, 
crushed, or excised genitals – notably eunuchs – are not excluded but 
included as full members. We might point here to narratives such as 
Acts 8, the story of the Ethiopian eunuch baptized with no mention 
of his physical difference, or Jesus’s words about eunuchs from birth, 
those made eunuchs by others and those who made themselves eunuchs 
for the sake of the Kingdom in Matthew 19, which some interpreters 
understand as including present day intersex and transgender people. 
And Isaiah 56, an example of a Biblical pun where we’re told eunuchs 
will be given a name better than sons and daughters, an everlasting 
name which will not be cut off. Let the reader understand.
Now those who’ve had theological reservations about transgender have 
often started from the conviction that human bodies and identities, 
but especially bodies, have a certain givenness, an irreducibility, a 
directedness as created by God, and that therefore there are certain 
things and only certain things that it’s legitimate to do to and be in them. 
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So for example, Oliver O’Donovan the British evangelical ethicist holds 
to know oneself as body is to know that there are only certain things 
that one can do and be, because one’s freedom must be responsible to 
a given form which is the form of one’s own experience in the material 
world.
Beyond this, there are also concerns about whether gender transition 
tends to lead to or perhaps to mask same-sex relationships as well as 
the pastoral anxieties we’ve already mentioned about the effects of 
transition on family members of the transitioning person. O’Donovan 
though is particularly concerned about issues of illusion versus reality 
and the extent to which surgically created genitals may be understood 
as veritably human. Interestingly though, O’Donovan in common with 
some other theological interpreters outlaws medical interventions for 
transgender people but has no problem with them for intersex people, 
those who have an unusual physical sex. 
The argument here is that where physical sex is atypical it is appropriate 
to clarify it, but that this is not true for gender identity. So physical sex 
is understood as the irreducible thing which must not be changed for 
transgender people, yet it is fine to alter it for intersex people, because I 
think of the assumption that intersex already represents a deviation from 
God’s intention.
However, those who rail against transgender interventions because 
they’re unnatural may not feel so exercised about organ transplants, 
cochlear implants, laser eye surgery, prosthetic limbs, or a host of the 
ways that we intervene to augment our bodies, perhaps because we tend 
to understand sex and gender as somehow more fundamental than other 
aspects of our bodilyness. Yet, as I’ve argued at length elsewhere, the 
inconsistency in responses to transgender and to intersex suggests that 
something more is going on. 
While opponents to transgender intervention often hold that this 
is because human embodiment and animality are irreducible and 
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shouldn’t be eroded often because of a good Christian commitment to 
concreteness, context, and incarnation, responses to intersex hints that 
there is something else underlying appeals to bodily integrity, and that 
bodies themselves may need to be brought into line with a more binary 
gender than binary sexed assumption about what true divinely intended 
human life actually looks like. But if binary gender is grounded in 
binary sex, what’s the rationale for arguing that even people who do 
not have a clear binary sex must also have a clear binary gender? 
Significantly though it’s not just critics of transgender who appeal to 
givenness. 
Many transgender people themselves also appeal to givenness, but 
in this case the irreducibility of their gender identity which they too 
often understand as divinely ordained. Several transgender Christians 
including clergy, names such as Carol Stone, Rachel Mann, Sarah Jones, 
Justin Tannis, have written and spoken of the deep and intertwined 
relationship between their vocation to ordained ministry and their 
calling to live their lives in the gender they’ve always understood 
themselves to be.
So Tanis for example says, “I look at my experiences of gender as the 
following of an invitation of God to participate in a new, whole, and 
healthy way of living in the world – a holy invitation to set out on 
a journey of transformation of body, mind, and spirit.” Tanis writes 
powerfully of his understanding of gender as calling, not just for 
transgender people but for everyone, and he notes that in common with 
other vocations it may be revealed all at once or gradually over a long 
period.
Rachel Mann acknowledges that her transition was, and I’m quoting her 
directly, an act of violence against the normal course of things, and yet 
she says “Without it I would not have achieved the degree and depth of 
self-reconciliation that I have.” 
Another theologian writing about transgender, Tricia Sheffield, has 
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argued that Christ’s body as constructed in Calcedonian belief is 
somehow trans. It’s simultaneously human and divine, and therefore 
it’s polymorphous and transmutative with both natures preserved. Since 
Christians believe in this body of Christ as well as helping to constitute 
it, Christ’s body might be a particularly important sight of solidarity and 
hope for transgender people. 
Now the work of some recent Christian writers, particularly 
evangelicals in response to transgender including Mark Yarhouse, 
Andrew Walker that I’ve already mentioned, may just on gender 
dysphoria, that is the sense of alienation and exclusion from their bodies 
that many transgender people feel, and as a result these theorists argue 
that the most therapeutic option for those transgender people will be 
to come to feel reconciled to their bodies but without any surgical or 
hormonal intervention. There’s thus far been less acknowledgement 
from that branch of the church that peace and reconciliation may 
come about through and not despite gender transition, and the broader 
recognition of one’s identity by others including one’s faith community.
So why spiritual care for transgender people? Well pastoral and spiritual 
care for trans people might usefully be understood as accompaniment 
across all stages of their lives before transition, during, and after any 
public gender transition. Such spiritual care might be an easy sell to 
those of us already invested in the place of faith and the supernatural in 
everyday life. However, in discussions about what should or could be 
provided by stretched healthcare systems, this aspect of the common 
good is not taken for granted. In a context like Britain where more and 
more people identify as having no religion, it may seem like a niche 
interest for an already stretched health service. 
But more broadly, spirituality is understood as referring to the whole 
person, the package of their physical, emotional, mental, social well-
being, particularly perhaps in the sense of belonging to something 
larger than that which we encounter in everyday life, and that could go 
regardless of whether or not someone adheres to a particular religious 
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tradition. So if we’re interested in negotiating goods and weighing 
up what constitutes the common good, we’ll be interested both in 
what’s good for communities as well as individuals, but also in what 
is commonly good for the different elements making up any given 
individual.
So we might say giving space to spirituality in healthcare is giving 
space to acknowledgment that the person is a whole person, lives in a 
community network, and is more than the sum of their body parts. And 
I could point you to a host of research on healthcare chaplaincy which 
demonstrates the importance of spiritual well-being for mental and 
physical health. 
Theologians including John Swinton have emphasized the importance 
of emotion, feeling, intuition, and a sense of something beyond essential 
to processes of care, and have noted that a person’s wider social and 
semantic context is not simply a backdrop to the real task of dealing 
with biological and psychological events which may be deemed 
pathological.
Now good healthcare providers know this. They know it already and 
they do all they can to promote holistic well-being, but even the best 
as we’ve heard are working within overstretched systems and may find 
they simply have less time and fewer resources than they would like. 
The goes particularly in the UK context for those working in gender 
medicine. The NHS mandates a maximum 18-week waiting time for 
access to interventions, and yet the numbers of trans people being 
referred have spiraled so much in the last few years that the waiting list 
is now over two years in place.
But anecdotal evidence suggests that a significant proportion of people 
seeking gender reassignment within the NHS in England do have a 
personal faith, and that their faith and spirituality are impacted by 
their gender incongruence and transition, and indeed this has been 
corroborated by recent testimonies, for example those of members of 
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Cybil’s transgender spirituality group who contributed to the collection 
This Is My Body which came out a couple of years ago, or those of the 
Anglican priest and poet Rachel Mann who I’ve already mentioned, 
who reflects profoundly on the interactions between her vocation to 
priesthood, herself understanding as transgender, and her complicated 
relationship with a body which is subject to illness and pain as a result 
of digestive disorders that she has. 
Now this may largely relate to factors external to the affected individual 
but might also for some people be a feature of minority stress and 
in particular internalized transphobia. However, for many people 
spirituality and faith are important sources of support and identity as 
they undergo medical interventions and experience challenging life 
changes. However, some trans people have found it difficult to find 
religious communities where they can receive the support they need. 
Sometimes that’s because of a suspicion within faith communities that 
transgender identity is either a rejection of a divine plan or simply 
evidence that something has gone wrong somewhere along the line, 
and such responses which are often compassionate but nonetheless 
characterized by a deep investment in the fixity of human sex and 
gender underline work by Yarhouse, Walker, and Roberts which I’ve 
already mentioned. So they aim to protect trans people’s families and 
communities, and they might therefore be said to uphold a common 
good, but I fear that it’s one which subsumes the good of the trans 
minority to the apparent good of the majority. 
And those both risks making trans people a kind of sacrificial scapegoat 
who must be sacrificed to shore up a shaky system, and I think does too 
little to interrogate whether a strongly binary system is actually bad for 
others, not just for trans people. Sometimes it takes an uncommon need 
for us to reevaluate our assumptions about what constitutes a common 
good. And sadly, religious communities have not always endorsed trans 
people’s sense of being accepted as effectively as they might’ve done, 
and I want to suggest that this impoverishes these faith communities 
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too.
For many trans people a key to good care is being encountered at all 
junctures as a whole person, not a set of hormones and body parts. 
Awareness of spirituality is awareness of this sense of personhood more 
broadly, awareness of a sense of future, and for many people awareness 
of being part of a universal community. And it’s for this reason that 
in partnership with an NHS gender clinic in England I’m currently 
formulating a framework for spiritual care for people undergoing gender 
transition that aims to understand the implications of spiritual care 
for broader mental and physical well-being, and which understands 
as individuals existing in community and developing character in 
community.
But a brief interlude. Some of you have been in classes this quarter 
whose theme is gender justice and the common good, and I met some 
of you in classes this morning. And as you might know, there was some 
opposition to the invitation issue to me to come and speak as part of this 
series, and in part that was because of work I’ve done in the past which 
detractors felt was blasphemous and undermined the family, and because 
I’m openly supportive of transgender people. but I wonder too whether 
the title raised red flags for some people, “Gendered Theologies and the 
Common Good”, because the term “gender” far from being neutral has 
become enormously freighted within Roman Catholic circles particularly 
in Europe. 
A recent special issue of the journal Religion and Gender focused on 
this controversy. Contributors pointed out that for the Vatican, appeals 
to gender and engagement with critical gender theory are assumed to 
go hand-in-hand with critiques of the assumption that binary human 
sex is natural and universal. Mary and Kate writing in that special issue 
holds that it was feminist discussions of gender in the 20th century 
which prompted the development of the notion of complementarity 
by Paul VI, John Paul II, and Benedict XVI, and she further argues 
that complementarity then came to underlie the Vatican’s theology and 
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ideology of human sex and sexuality not just in specifically religious 
terms but also legally and politically as part of its ongoing opposition to 
same-sex marriage. 
So Case wants to argue that the Catholic authorities feared that 
the gender agenda was motivated by a desire to deny the reality 
and irreducibility of human sexness as male and female, and she 
cites Benedict XVI’s appeal when he was _____ _____ against the 
trivialization of sexual specificity that makes every role interchangeable 
between man and woman. Sex no longer appears to be a determined 
characteristic as a radical and pristine orientation of the person. This 
was in opposition to radical feminists, but other contributors to the 
special issue note that concern about the apparent undermining of 
sexual essentialism also appears to underlie some Catholic authorities’ 
suspicion of transgender.
So taking all of that into account, in this climate the assumption might 
be and clearly has been for some people that gendered theologies are of 
necessity destructive ones, but I’m also interested in the broader title: 
Gender Justice and the Common Good. Some of you in your classes and 
broader work have been thinking about and reflecting on what is good 
for all people and what promotes the kind of people and the kind of 
culture and society you want to be. 
There are some transgender people who would consciously align 
themselves with queer theologies of the kind that have been suspicious 
of the phenomenon of family values, not least because as commentators 
like Mark Jordan and Lee Adelman have commented, appeals to 
innocents such as children have too often been happy to throw real 
children under the bus. That’s one tactic for rejecting the notion that 
family can only be understood as a mother, a father, and their biological 
children. 
And in fact, one of the things that I do in my most recent book is to 
explore the idea that actually the Christian tradition is replete with 
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models of family and kinship that are far more diverse than that, and 
there’s space within the tradition for exploring the ways in which 
Christianity itself actually disrupts family and says that our commitment 
is to not only our own group or our own tribe but to all children of God. 
We all know perfectly well that families can be destructive as well as 
affirming places, that they can harbor abuse and neglect, that children 
are often more at risk from their own relatives than from strangers.
In his work on the common good and the social order, Gary Dorrien has 
noted that appeals to a common good should not and cannot elide or 
erase all difference. There will likely remain appeals to good which take 
into account local circumstances and concepts, and this is appropriate. 
However, acknowledging this diversity does not in itself do away with 
any account of ethical normativity. It will still be possible to ask what 
tends towards justice.
So when we explore the common good we need to ask whether appeals 
only to binary models of sex and gender are really good for anyone 
or for any of us. We need to ask whether the endorsement of bodily 
materiality and specificity that underlines some rejections of the gender 
agenda goes far enough, or whether in its conscious endorsement of 
male and female it unconsciously excludes and pathologizes those 
whose bodies and identities don’t fit either category. 
This is particularly important given that variations from the statistical 
norm include not only psychological and emotional but also physical 
difference. And so in the next part of my lecture I want to move on to 
thinking about the tricky business of what happens when goods seem to 
collide, in this case in the care of intersex children.
Many parents have to make decisions about their children’s medical 
care and healthcare when children are too young to give consent for 
themselves. Parents who don’t consider themselves in any way experts 
on medical matters are likely to defer to the judgment of professionals 
involved with their child’s care, especially in emergency situations 
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where decisions have to be made quickly. But what happens when 
there’s debate over the best path of care, when parental decisions have 
implications for children’s well-being not just in the immediate future 
but throughout their lives, when parents and doctors disagree about 
care, or when in some situations parents are not the ones best placed to 
agree to decisions on behalf of their children?
Questions like this are brought into particularly sharp focus in the area 
of intersex, and for those of you not familiar with this terminology, 
intersex refers to people who are born with atypicalities of their physical 
sex such that their bodies can’t be classified as male or female. So their 
genitals, their gonads, their chromosomes, hormones, gamits, may vary 
from those we typically expect to find.
So for example, an intersex person may have an externally female 
body. They may have a vulva, a clitoris, breasts after puberty, however 
they would have internal testes and XY chromosomes rather than XX 
chromosomes. That would be one example. Other intersex people might 
have XX, that is female chromosomes, but a large clitoris which looks 
and functions more like a penis. And some intersex people have a mix 
of characteristics, some XX cells and some XY cells in the same body, 
a testes and an ovary, genitalia which don’t really look either male or 
female but something different.
Some people go through most or even all of their lives without ever 
realizing for example that they’re genetic mosaics, that is that they have 
a mix of XX and XY chromosomes or some female tissue alongside 
their male tissue. This might begin to prompt questions for us about 
how significant physical sex really is as a marker of identity and 
ontology if it’s not uncommon not even to know about it and yet to live 
a perfectly ordinary life.
But some differences are of course more evident from early on. When 
infants are born with visibly unusual genital anatomy, parents are likely 
to be asked to make decisions about their care soon after birth, and 
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what’s best for intersex infants is hugely debated particularly given 
criticisms since about the middle of the 1990s about early surgeries. 
Intersex adults and allies have been battling against that since then. 
Furthermore, decisions made by doctors or parents in the past might 
be considered to have been detrimental to the long-term good of the 
intersex adult.
So ethics in this area are about the difficult task of weighing up present 
and projected goods and deciding which and whose goods should be 
most closely guarded. Christian theological ethics and theological 
anthropology contain rich and varied discussions surrounding the 
moral and the cosmic significance of human sex differentiation. For 
some commentators following in the footsteps of Thomas Aquinas for 
example or Carl Bart or Hanses Von Balthazar, human sex relationship 
is synectoky like a little mini version an example of the divine human 
relationship, and something of the meaning of being human is found in 
sex itself, particularly as this tends – for these writers it tends in male 
terms – towards generativity, towards reproduction.
Bart argued that the way that human females were to follow and to 
respond to human males echoed the way that all humans were to follow 
and respond to God. To deny the order and procession built into human 
sex and gender, Bart believed, would be to deny the broader divine 
order. The problem with this is that it assumes a hierarchy of genders 
simply is natural and indisputable rather than being a social construction 
which presents its own problems and might actually prevent women 
and people with unusual sex gender configurations from developing 
relationships with God in their own right.
And in contrast I’ve wanted to suggest that while to be human is 
irreducibly to be sexed, human sex does not manifest only along male or 
female lines, and biological generativity is a frequent but not a universal 
concomitant. Intersex people’s humanity is in no way compromised 
because their sex is atypical. Rather, intersex is one phenomenon which 
disrupts the apparent incontrovertibility of clear and binary biological 
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sex as a human characteristic, and I’ve explored this at greater length in 
two of my books as well as the new book I’ve already mentioned.
But another really useful text that I’ve put up here as well is Megan 
Defranza’s book Sex Difference in Christian Theology: Male, 
Female, and Intersex in the Image of God. Rooted in her evangelical 
background, but targeted particularly at a Roman Catholic readership. 
In the last two decades, many intersex activists and other commentators 
have been vocally critical of the paradigm under which children with 
atypical genitalia were likely to undergo early corrective surgery such 
as the reduction of a large clitoris, the removal of a small penis, or the 
creation of a vaginal opening. 
Critics of the early corrective surgery model have argued that unusual 
genitals are almost never in themselves of any detriment to physical 
health and that there’s no need to perform surgery in infancy or 
childhood, and those familiar with this area of ethics will know that 
at its very heart are tussles over competing goods and questions 
about whether justice for society at large is best served by early and 
compulsory medical intervention for children with unusual bodies. 
Intersex activists and critical theorists have argued that actually secrecy 
and misinformation surrounding the medical treatment of intersex 
have been as harmful if not more harmful than unusual physical 
manifestations have been.
And from the mainstream medical side I think another set of goods 
has been at stake, that is around intervening to promote normality, the 
assumption that children need to be clearly sexed and appropriately 
gendered in order to be happy and normal, and perhaps a suggestion 
implicit rather than explicit that’s allowing unusually sexed bodies to 
persist uncorrected is in some way threatening to the good of society 
at large. Many doctors today still believe that to be happy and well-
adjusted someone must be clearly male or female, and that if there’s 
any question about sex it’s appropriate to tweak the body for the sake of 
future gender identity.
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Doctors aren’t unique in that respect. We can see similar assumptions 
in the work of writers like Yarhouse and Roberts as well as O’Donovan 
and others. Furthermore, many parents also assume that clear sex 
is a prerequisite of the normality they want for their children. But 
increasingly as we’ve heard, commentators suggest that risks to 
psychological well-being with atypical anatomy may cause have 
been overstated and that what’s more psychologically damaging 
is undergoing invasive genital surgery, frequent examination and 
hospitalization, not being told the truth about one’s condition, and 
growing up in a climate of secrecy.
 
Now doctors who do intervene appeal to a range of goods to justify 
their intervention. Many continue to believe that early surgery promotes 
better psychological outcomes later; others also believe it’s necessary 
for parents to see normal-looking genitals in order to be able to 
bring up their child without ambivalence. Parental desires for normal 
children stem I think not from selfishness but from a sincere belief that 
difference and abnormality often lead to suffering and bullying and are 
best avoided. Parents are aware that they’re not bringing children up in 
a vacuum, and that not being readily identifiable as a boy or a girl is one 
of the first things that might make their children vulnerable.
What else are they to do but to make decisions which seem as though 
they’ll promote happiness and normality for their child? But even when 
they’re working with a wide range of information, parents my privilege 
more pressing or immediate goods over more distant or nebulous ones. 
This is not particularly surprising or sinister. After all, not all parents are 
conversant with the critical gender theory that’s been so prevalent in the 
intersex discussion. 
They may not be aware that early surgery is being criticized from 
so many quarters. They might be ashamed or embarrassed or just 
bewildered at being told by doctors that they’re not sure about their 
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baby’s sex. They may feel squeamish thinking about their baby’s future 
sex life. They’ll also have other concerns in mind. What might happen 
to them as a family if their child’s unusual body goes uncorrected, or if 
they don’t conceal the uncertainty surrounding their child’s sex?
In short, parents are likely to make choices which they believe will 
promote their child’s happiness, but the existence of the strongly binary 
gendered paradigm that we have in Western societies influenced by 
Christian theological goods and norms means that few parents are 
confident enough to believe that growing up with atypical genitalia or 
perhaps a non-binary gender identity could promote happiness. Eva 
Fada-Kutay has argued that a purported desire for normality by parents 
is actually shorthand for a desire for other goods: safety, comfort, 
stability. 
Normality equals desirability. It’s a communal good rather than an 
individual one. Significantly however, what is considered normal is 
not fixed. It’s likely to shift and alter as social morays do. Additionally 
communal goods and individual goods will not always be identical. 
Kutay argues that excessive conformity is morally repugnant and gives 
rise to blandness for those who remain within the norm and isolation for 
those excluded. 
So one tactic for those parents who face having abnormal children, 
including parents of intersex children, will be to construct new 
normalities based for example on seeking out other families in similar 
situations. Importantly in this way they don’t reject the concept of 
normality altogether. Indeed they affirm that it’s appropriate and good 
for normal parents to create safe and supportive environments for their 
children. But, says Kutay, what they affirm is an altered conception of 
the norm.
The new norms are generated out of a newly constituted habitus, one 
that emerges under changed conditions of existence and through the 
formation of a different community. The new community is not distinct 
from the old, nor are its conditions of existence entirely different. There 
are continuities and discontinuities. So Christian communities I want 
to say might also be instrumental in promoting new conceptions of 
belonging and legitimacy which don’t rest only in binary sex norms, 
particularly given the tradition’s long history of endorsing non-kinship 
relationships, households, and other communities.
One of the things I explore in my new book is the idea that there will be 
flashes of affinity between the family values claimed as such and those 
which embrace more expansive modes, including perhaps same-sex 
marriage, and that there will be both continuity and discontinuity with 
more familiar versions of institutions like marriage and family. 
So one question could be whether and when the goods of promoting 
family goals might be preferred over goods merely belonging to 
individual children. Could a family’s need for normality and avoiding 
unwelcome attention override an intersex child’s good in having 
their bodily integrity respected? And the broadest possible range of 
adult sexual outcomes kept open for them. What family goods might 
Christian theologians want to claim where the family is the religious 
community in which the child is growing up as well as the immediate 
biological family, or whether moral community can be understood even 
more broadly as society at large.
As Russ notes, respecting persons includes respecting their 
potential goods as well as their actual ones. I want to suggest that 
eschatologically inflected ethics in the context of decision-making 
on ethical care for intersex infants will mean that future goods are 
considered alongside present ones. If human goods are constructed 
as those which anticipate and inaugurate an order beyond binaries, 
and which recognize the importance of provisionality in resisting the 
maximization of human ideology, then decision-making for intersex and 
for broader questions of care will acknowledge person’s future existence 
in the incoming order, not just their existence within the present one. 
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Taking future goods seriously will usually mean making choices 
which least limit the future options for the child concerned. Now we 
might immediately note there an area of tension between intersex and 
transgender. After all, some interventions for transgender are also 
serious and irreversible. Is it not hypocritical to hold that intersex 
children should have their options kept open as possible if we don’t say 
the same about transgender?
Well, a couple of responses to that. First as I’ve noted, most people who 
transition gender and undergo gender confirmation surgery are already 
well established in their adult lives, and I haven’t been talking and I’m 
not at all talking today about the ethics of intervention for children with 
a transgender identity. That is a whole conversation that we don’t have 
time for today. Suffice to say that irreversible interventions for under 
18’s remain extremely rare, and that medics tend precisely to advocate 
delaying making permanent decisions for as long as possible. Young 
trans people may be offered hormones to delay their puberty in order to 
give them more time to come to understand the momentous nature of 
some of their decisions.
Furthermore though, sadly it’s the case that not intervening for trans 
people doesn’t always mean in practice more options for their future. In 
fact, many trans people experience such distress and dysphoria that they 
self-harm and even take their own lives such that their future in this 
earthly realm at least is abruptly curtailed. It’s here that we do butt up 
against a continuing area of tension between transgender and intersex. 
It’s indisputable that at least some trans people do inhabit a strongly 
binary mindset, not challenging the notion that there are men and 
women and that they’re different from each other, but simply holding 
that they should’ve been born the other one.
By contrast, intersex people and their advocates are far more likely to 
challenge the binary system all told, holding that sex and gender are 
more of a continuum than a binary. But in both cases from a theological 
anthropological angle we might want to reflect on how our lives and 
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bodies as we experience them here and now relate to our hope and 
expectation of embodied lives in the age to come.
Yurgan Moltman, the Christian theologian working in Germany, holds 
that there must be continuity and discontinuity between this age and 
the age to come in terms of the relationships and social goods currently 
in operation. The newness that comes about in the eschaton, he says, 
makes the old order obsolete but not by annihilating it. Rather, he says, 
it gathers it up and creates it a new. The eschaton completes the first 
creation so that what is remembered is caught up and preserved in hope, 
and what is past is surpassed in the future.
Similarly for Carl Bart, eschatology anticipates a resurrection in which 
humans are raised as ourselves. So eschatology involves redemption, 
not erasure of what is and has been. Where it’s been assumed that 
deviation from binary male and female is deviation from a divine 
creational norm, it may be assumed that such redemption would involve 
healing intersex bodies, and that medical interventions in this life might 
be considered in anticipation of such healing. There are theologians who 
make exactly that argument.
But in the affirmation that what we see now is not all that is, we need 
perhaps to reexamine assumptions about what makes good or healthy 
bodies. Intervention to correct unusual sex may limit possibility not 
just for this specific body but for human bodies in general. This is why 
it’s so important that we’re beginning to hear from intersex adults, not 
only about their critiques of early corrective surgery but also about their 
experiences of spirituality and self-understanding of their bodies as 
sights of divine revelation. 
I’ve drawn on interviews with intersex Christians in some of my own 
work who appeal for example to the belief that God made them and 
wove them together in their mother’s womb, in the words of Psalm 139, 
and felt that there must be a bigger purpose, that this was happening 
within God’s plan and God’s intention. Spiritual care for this population 
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means taking seriously these body stories without dismissing them 
as more fallen or further from God’s intention than others, but there 
continue to exist accounts which call this into question and hold that 
intersex somehow contradicts the orders of creation. 
Several intersex Christians from whom I’ve heard in the last few 
weeks are deeply dismayed by the Council for Biblical Manhood and 
Womanhood’s Nashville statement on human sex, gender, and sexuality. 
Since while at first sight this appears to acknowledge the existence of 
intersex in non-condemnatory fashion, reading between the lines it 
actually appears to do the opposite and to mandate surgical intervention 
to clarify binary sex.
So in the context of decision-making about intersex infants’ care and 
promotion of the common good, an important question is what kind 
of persons the community wishes to cultivate. What are the virtues 
and qualities the Christian community wishes doctors, parents, and 
we ourselves, whether we’re intersex people or others invested in 
promoting intersex goods to have? How might such virtues be endorsed 
or elighted in giving care pathways including spiritual care? What are 
the family goods of the Christian Church?
For many Christian ethicists, wisdom and virtue have been understood 
as participation in bringing about God’s new order. Christians might 
judiciously be circumspect about assuming that the fulfillment of 
a divine intent for human sex in creation necessarily entails the 
endorsement and maintenance only of binary sex and gender as goods. 
If inaugurated eschatology entails the in-breaking of the world to 
come, living prophetically may mean challenging the order of things. 
These principles chime with more mainstream accounts of the new 
creation, for John Zazulas for example eschatology profoundly entails 
reconciliation, and the activity of the Church on earth are four tastes of 
it. 
The Church may be figured then as a place where reconciliation is 
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imagined and difference celebrated. Reconciliation will not necessarily 
mean erasure of difference, but as in theologies of disability, 
transformation of its significance. Zazulas describes the communion of 
all things overcoming our presently mutually antagonistic communions. 
If virtue is the education of character and community, then for the 
Church. Eucharist is a mean by which this occurs. 
Christians are schooled in the necessity of the acknowledgement of 
the equality of embodied experience before God. If our scatological 
resurrection bodies are not necessarily figured as binary sexed, then 
removing uncertainty and constructing assemblance of binary sex now 
need not be the best or only way to inscribe legitimacy in the just future 
we’re helping to build.
The account with which I opened, that of the vision of the NHS at its 
construction is one powerful account, but as I said not an unchallenged 
one, and one which raises as many questions as answers about the 
necessary bounds of the community, and that tension is repeated in 
dilemmas about how to squeeze good spiritual care into a creaking 
system and how to negotiate whose goods are paramount. 
Yet as Gary Dorrien notes, recognizing conflicting and competing 
accounts doesn’t mean giving up on the possibility of a just common 
future. We can appeal to a common good because we are of a common 
kind. We are of the same genus. We are all human kin. We share the 
same genre, yet genre can be limiting as well as democratizing. It can 
be genericizing. It can be stultifying, and it’s here I begin the discussion 
in my new book, holding that each new human is both entirely a 
product of their culture and history and entirely something new with the 
potential to generate.
For this reason as humans we’re not condemned to repeat or reinforce 
what’s been passed down to us. We shape it just as it has shaped us. 
Accounts of marriage, family, health, well-being, and the good, none of 
these is immaculate or unchanging, rather they develop over time and in 
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conversation with historic and contemporary traditions, and it’s in and 
through mutual relationship between the people formed by institutions 
and the institutions formed by people that Christians create and recreate 
their faith.
So one of the things we’ve considered today as I draw to a close is that 
sex and gender don’t always seem to match in typical ways even at a 
biological level. Transgender and intersex show that sex and gender 
may not always be as straightforward as they seem. Should they then be 
understood as anomalies which don’t fundamentally disrupt the model 
of there being two distinct and separate human genders which map on to 
two distinct and separate human sexes as God intended, or alternatively 
should the existence of transgender and intersex prompt theologians to 
reexamine their theological anthropologies and ask whether theologies 
which assume a fixed binary model of maleness and femaleness 
continue to make sense in light of what we now know of human sex and 
gender. 
Theologies which assume maleness and femaleness can’t easily 
accommodate hard cases, but if intersex and transgender are not 
just exceptions to the rule but actually mean that Christians should 
reexamine their whole understanding of sex and gender, asking what 
constitutes a common good, that is good for these embodied, divinely 
made, and God-imaging people too, will be central to our project. 
While heterosexual norms might have been convenient bedfellows for 
Christianity at certain places and times in its history, its conflation with 
them must be resisted. Only by retelling and reclaiming lost stories 
about multiple genders, identities, bodies and lives, can God’s own lack 
of anexability be emphasized. Thank you very much.
